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‘I don’t think there is any moral basis for taking money away from 
people’: Using Discursive Psychology to explore the complexity of talk 
about tax 
The increasing recognition of the negative impact of income inequality has 
highlighted the importance of taxation which can function as a 
redistributive mechanism.  Previous critical social psychological research 
found that talk about restricting the welfare state, that is funded through 
tax, is formed of ideology that supports the maintenance of income 
inequality.  Therefore, this research explores how speakers use talk about 
tax to justify income inequality during a UK BBC radio discussion, ‘Moral 
Maze: The moral purpose of tax’ which involved public figures discussing 
the role of tax. This programme was analysed from a critical discursive 
psychological perspective.  It was found that two contrasting constructions 
of tax were presented: tax as a collective responsibility or tax as an 
individual burden, whereby speakers drew on social justice and 
individualistic ideology respectively.  Arguments for high tax rates are 
problematic due to the acceptability of inequality in a meritocracy.  By 
presenting wealthy individuals as more deserving than the less affluent, 
arguments for higher tax come to be challenged.   
 
Keywords: taxation; income inequality; discursive psychology; just world; 
meritocracy; ideology 
Introduction 
Income inequality has increased more in the UK since 1975 than any other OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) nation (OECD, 2011). 
This has coincided with tax policies which have reduced the tax rate for higher earners 
and corporations (Fuchs, 2016).  Income inequality is problematic because it has been 
shown to contribute to social problems such as crime, lower educational attainment and 
decreased wellbeing (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010).  The level of government expenditure 
on public services such as education and crime prevention is largely determined by tax 
revenue. In 2012-13, there was an estimated tax gap of £34 billion between anticipated 
revenue (the level of revenue the Government would expect given economic activity) 
and actual revenue received (HM Revenue and Customs, 2014).  Over £15 billion of the 
tax gap is estimated to be the result of ‘types of behaviour that illegally deprive the 
Exchequer of tax revenue’ such as tax evasion (£4.4bn), the shadow economy (£6.2bn) 
and criminal attacks (£5.1bn) whilst tax avoidance is estimated separately at £2.7bn 
(National Audit Office, 2015:4).  Given the positive impact this lost tax revenue could 
have on redistributing income in society and reducing the negative impact of inequality, 
there is a need to explore talk about tax and its relationship with inequality.  
Economic Psychology explanations of tax paying behaviour 
Economic psychology provides an opportunity to explore approaches to tax and 
inequality.  However, as will be demonstrated, economic psychology’s attempts at 
explaining the role of tax have methodological limitations. Economic psychology 
as a discipline is considered to have been established in 1881 (Tarde, 1902) and 
involves the research of ‘psychological mechanisms and processes that underlie 
consumption and other economic behaviour’ (Wärneryd, 2013:9).  For economic 
psychologists, tax is a 'social contribution dilemma, in which individual gain runs 
contrary to the collective good' (Alm, 2013, p.7).  The ‘Tax Affinity Hypothesis’ 
proposes that some individuals pay more tax than would be expected by economic 
models (that assume self-interest) by suggesting that taxpayers exhibit pro social 
behaviour and receive a positive psychological benefit from paying taxes (Djanali 
& Sheehan- Connor, 2012).  Thus, there is a role for psychological research in 
exploring how the tax paying dilemma is constructed by individuals and how they 
account for their tax paying behaviour. 
Economic psychology is dominated by positivist approaches using experimental 
economic games.  For example, Calvet- Christian and Alm (2014) use:  
a ‘Tax Compliance Game’. The game consists of 6 independent one-shot tax 
compliance decisions with different settings of audit probabilities, penalties, 
and returns from the tax amount paid. These decisions are presented at the 
same time, and are made without any feedback about other participants’ 
decisions (p. 66)  
A problem with these games is that they lack ecological validity due to issues defining 
tax avoidance and evasion.  Avoidance is where individuals utilise tax policy to reduce 
their contribution (Hill, 2010) and tax evasion is defined by its illegality (Hashimzade, 
Myles, Page & Rablen, 2014).  The boundary between evasion and avoidance in 
everyday life can be unclear (Kirchler, 2009) and this cannot be replicated within an 
experimental game with rules.  In addition to this, the small pay offs individuals receive 
in the games do not reflect the potential gains to be obtained from tax evasion (Kirchler, 
2009).  Other critiques of experimental approaches highlight that taxpayers are not 
isolated from each other (Schotter, 2012) and their behaviour does not necessarily 
reflect their taxpaying behaviour (Torgler, 2002).  The validity of the experimental 
approach using economic games is affected by difficulties in defining the boundary 
between tax planning, evasion and avoidance.  In addition to this, experimental 
approaches do not consider how tax avoidance and evasion are understood and socially 
constructed in differing environments.  By focusing on individual tax behaviour, 
researchers ignore the issue of whether or not tax is presented by individuals as fair and 
as something that should be paid by those in employment.  
The role of ideology in supporting inequality 
The issues of experimental approaches to tax can be overcome by adopting a critical 
social psychological perspective.  In particular, drawing upon a discursive and rhetorical 
approach can explore how people construct tax as problematic in talk.  Lerner (1980) 
argued that people have an erroneous belief in a just world and that this belief explains a 
tendency to blame victims for their suffering. If applied to income inequality, this ‘Just 
World Hypothesis’ would predict popular support for income inequality in line with the 
belief that people essentially ‘get what they deserve’ (Lerner, 1980, p.11) and that 
financial income must be a reflection of merit, effort and talents.  Goodman and Carr 
(2017), however, argue that accounts of inequality that draw on the notion of a just 
world represent an ideological stance rather than an internal attributional style or 
cognitive bias. For Billig (1995, p.15):  
‘It is not a matter of empirically testing the belief to discover its validity.  The 
analyst of ideology must ask where this belief- our belief- originated from and 
what it assumes.  We must question- or put into ideological brackets- the very 
concepts which seem so solidly real to us’.    
It is the role of the researcher to explore how ideological positions are socially and 
historically constructed.  By acknowledging that inequality is not inevitable, the 
rationale for using tax to redistribute wealth can be bolstered. In contrast, just world 
accounts may be viewed as rendering social inequality as the inevitable outcome of 
variation in effort and talent. Such forms of explanation absolve the state, and by 
extension the taxpayer, of moral accountability for addressing financial inequality and 
poverty. It also justifies a low tax economy and reduced public spending. Attribution 
research typically fails to fully take into consideration of how talk about social 
causation is utilized as a form of social action (Gibson, 2009). In this article, we argue 
that just world arguments about taxation are ideological positions used to absolve tax 
payers of responsibility and to present economic inequality as natural and inevitable. 
Discursive Social Psychology as an alternative approach 
Discursive Social Psychology (DSP) is a 'synthetic' form of Discursive 
Psychology (DP) (Wetherell, 1998:288).  DSP draws on DP through its emphasis 
on how individuals manage their accountability for their taxpaying status and use 
their talk about tax to construct their identity.  Individuals use talk to manage their 
accountability through their self-presentation (Stokoe, 2003) which highlights the 
complexity of identity in discourse (Lynn & Lea, 2003). However, as Potter 
(2010) documents the evolution of discursive and rhetorical psychology has 
resulted in differing approaches, one has involved DP becoming more aligned 
with Conversation Analysis. The infamous debate between Wetherell (1998), 
Schegloff (1999) and Billig (1999) outlined the issues in this development 
resulting in an analysis that, according to Wetherell and Billig, ignored the 
situatedness of the data and how this prevented constructs such as gender from 
being included in the analysis. 
As a result of this, DSP developed as a discursive approach that attends to 
the influence of cultural ideology, the broader social context in which talk about 
issues such as tax takes place. Part of this ideological focus involves examining 
how interpretative repertoires are used within talk (Edley and Wetherell, 1997). 
Interpretative repertoires are the ‘building blocks’ of talk that are formed of 
identifiable everyday assumptions including metaphors and are used to construct 
individuals’ accounts (Wetherell and Potter 1988:172).  DSP can therefore 
examine how individuals manage their accountability for issues such as tax 
avoidance within an interactional context.  
According to a DSP approach, talk about tax should be understood in 
terms of how people use their status as a taxpayer to construct their identity. For 
example, Goodman and Rowe (2014) found that Romanies used their status as 
taxpayers to refute negative claims about themselves as a group and to create a 
positive presentation through their contribution to society.  Therefore, talk about 
taxpaying is used to emphasise one’s positive contribution to society. However, in 
the above example, talk about tax was incidental rather than the main focus of the 
study. 
DSP also allows for the role of context and ideology in talk to be 
acknowledged and explored (Augoustinos, 2013; Edley and Wetherell, 1997) 
drawing on Billig's (1991) rhetorical psychology to consider such talk within its 
broader rhetorical context.  As a result, the interactional context of the data can be 
acknowledged while recognising wider ideological concerns (Gibson, 2015). 
Therefore, DSP differs from standard DP by emphasising an analytical political 
focus, including the role of ideology, rather than DP’s focus on participants’ 
orientations. An ideological focus is important when considering discourse around 
taxation and its role in income inequality. DSP therefore provides an opportunity 
to explore the use of ideology in discourse about tax that is reflected in policy 
decisions regarding welfare state provision (Hamwee, Miall & Elworthy, 1990). 
Talk about poverty and the welfare state is full of ideological dilemmas (Billig, 
Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton, & Radley, 1988), where a speaker’s talk is 
formed of two conflicting ideological positions.  Ideological dilemmas are a 
common feature of everyday talk and are presented as common sense (Pettersson, 
2017).  Regarding the welfare state, Billig (1982, p.200) suggests, there is 
typically “a recognition of injustice, with a counterbalancing ‘on the other hand’ 
to support the idea that some poor people deserve their situation”. People may on 
the one hand support the idea of a ‘safety net’ for those who fall on hard times 
while on the other hand oppose the idea of a system that promotes a culture of 
dependency.  
The notion of a just world has been shown to be used to oppose the 
welfare state by presenting benefit payments as unfair as they require working 
people to subsidise economically inactive benefit claimants (Goodman & Carr, 
2017). Such rhetoric constructs the welfare state not only as unfair but also 
detrimental to society as it discourages ‘effortfulness’ (Gibson 2009, p.400).  This 
discourse is used to legitimise state scrutiny of benefit claimant’s behaviour and to 
hold individuals to account for their circumstances (Goodman & Carr, 2017). The 
current study will complement existing research regarding discourse on welfare 
state provision and extend this by examining how talk about taxation can be used 
to justify economic inequality. In doing so this paper aims to enhance our 
understanding of the ideology and rhetoric that maintains income inequality in the 
UK.   
 
Method 
Data 
The corpus consisted of a single episode of the BBC Radio 4 series Moral Maze, ‘The 
moral purpose of tax’ (Moral Maze, 2014).  This programme provides an opportunity to 
analyse a discussion that is explicitly focused on tax and morality.  As such, the 
broadcast is illustrative of the competing ideologies present in talk about tax that 
speakers can draw upon in their discourse.  The data is naturally occurring resulting in 
its alignment with the theoretical approach. Moral Maze is a discussion based 
programme presented by Michael Buerk, which involves public figures such as former 
politicians, journalists and religious figures discussing moral and ethical issues raised 
by recent news stories. The decision to utilise publicly available data allows for a 
naturally occurring discussion of a controversial topic.  The programme offers an overt 
opportunity to explore how morality around taxation is constructed as this is generally 
not the focus of talk about tax in the media. This allows for a detailed exploration of the 
construction of ideology in the talk of influential individuals that impact upon taxation 
policy in the UK and the status of income inequality which, as the title of the 
programme demonstrates, has been framed as a moral issue.   
Analytic Procedure 
The analytical procedure was in accordance with the principles of DSP as identified by 
Gibson (2009).  This approach to analysis places an emphasis on identifying the 
interpretative repertoires present and their underlying ideology.  The corpus was 
transcribed utilising a basic notation that is consistent with critical forms of discursive 
and rhetorical approaches (Wiggins, 2017).  The initial analytic procedure involved a 
thorough reading of the corpus to identify the action orientation present in the talk.  This 
was then followed by a closer reading to consider the construction of positions and 
ideological dilemmas present in the talk on taxation.  Further work involved identifying 
how participants managed accountability when involved in discourse about taxation. 
Findings 
There are two competing representations of tax illustrated within the debate. One draws 
on individual responsibility and presents tax as problematic. The other uses a social 
justice repertoire which constructs taxation as a beneficial resource to obtain public 
goods and an investment in future generations.  In the last extract, an ideological 
dilemma is present where the speaker is required to manage two competing repertoires, 
social justice and individual responsibility.  Constructions of taxation evoke moral 
positions which require individuals to manage their accountability by utilising political, 
economic and moral rhetoric within their talk.   
When representing tax as problematic, speakers present tax as eroding individual 
responsibility.  In the following extract, former Conservative cabinet minister, Michael 
Portillo (MPo), and finance commentator and blogger, Frances Coppola (FC), discuss 
whether there should be higher levels of tax for affluent individuals.  
Extract One 
1.  
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
6.   
7.   
FC: 
 
 
 
I mean one, one of the sort of things that has been 
suggested is that you have very, very high levels of 
taxation say 100% marginal taxation on er, people on 
very high incomes but that’s more a way of adjusting 
behaviour rather than trying to raise any money and a 
question is whether the state has the right to try and 
adjust people’s behaviour in that way. 
8.   
9.  
10.  
11.  
MPo: I mean just now the erm the top er 1% of income tax 
payers provide a quarter of the income that comes 
from income tax what l, what level would you like it to 
be at? 
12.   FC: Why is that a problem? 
13.   
14.  
MPo: I didn’t say it was a problem, I said what level would 
you like it to be at? 
15.  
16.  
FC: Personally, I have no problem with them paying a 
quarter of it. 
17.  MPo: A quarter about right then. 
18.  FC: They could pay more probably. 
Frances Coppola acknowledges that others may consider high rates of tax to be 
controversial as they affect individual freedom by encouraging specific behaviours.  
This highlights positions on taxation as being contentious and requires individuals to 
take efforts to manage their accountability. Frances Coppola utilises a neutral ‘footing’ 
(Goffman, 1981:152) to state that ‘one of the sort of things that has been suggested is’ 
(1-2) which allows Frances Coppola to distance herself from the position of having high 
tax rates. This involves the use of ‘but’ before constructing tax as affecting individual 
autonomy, ‘but that’s more a way of adjusting behaviour’ (4-5).  This allows Frances 
Coppola to present tax as dilemmatic in relation to the relationship between the state 
and the individual as tax is constructed as regulating individual behaviour.  Therefore, 
high taxation is presented as contentious as a result of its challenge to individual agency 
as it is motivated by the state’s intention to change behaviour. 
Speakers are required to manage their position regarding higher tax rates due to 
the controversy about increased taxes for wealthy individuals. Michael Portillo provides 
a fact from an unreported source about the proportion of income tax the top 1% of 
income taxpayers contribute, (‘the top er 1% of income tax payers provide a quarter of 
the income that comes from income tax’, 8-10).  The difficulty of presenting an 
individualistic construction of tax is negotiated through the use of an impartial position 
using ‘you’ to request a personal response from Frances Coppola, ‘what level would 
you like it to be at?’ (10-11 and 13-14).  Frances Coppola orients to Michael Portillo’s 
fact as presenting the tax burden on the rich as too high. Impartiality can be seen as a 
way in which to present contentious issues (Edwards & Potter, 1992) and can be viewed 
in Frances Coppola’s response: ‘Why is that a problem?’ (12). Michael Portillo rejects 
this question and repeats the earlier question (13-14) to hold Frances Coppola to 
account regarding her personal view.  This demonstrates the contentiousness present in 
discourse about tax as individuals take steps to manage their accountability regarding 
rates of taxation.   
The use of taxpayers’ money to deliver public services that reduce inequality are 
discussed in the next extract.  This involves managing the presentation of the rights of 
affluent individuals and their moral accountability which involves resisting the 
construction of taxation as a redistributive resource.  In extract two, Melanie Phillips 
(MPh) a journalist who is politically oriented to the right, presents redistribution 
through tax as immoral; whilst Mehdi Hasan (MH), journalist and presenter on Al 
Jazeera English, who is oriented to the left, challenges this by constructing wealth as the 
product of individuals benefitting from public services. 
Extract Two 
1.  
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
6.   
7.   
8.  
9.  
MPh: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personally, personally I think that erm the argument 
which says that they’re going to er the main reason for 
taxation, the main purpose for taxation is redistribution 
is an immoral argument er because I don’t think there is 
any moral basis for taking money away from people in 
order to give it to other people because you are basically 
removing moral agency.  Erm, someone said earlier you 
know luck is not unfair erm er, it’s I think that one has a 
duty to be er, 
10.  MH: Melanie you didn’t make… 
11.  MPh:              Solicitous 
12.   
13.   
14.  
MH: You didn’t make that money on your own.  You made 
that money thanks to money investments in your 
society, in your education, in healthcare. 
15.   
16.   
17.  
MPh:                   You assume (.) yeah, that’s an 
assumption, the assumption that you have is that all 
wealth is basically ill gotten and all poverty is moral 
Melanie Phillips presents tax (and the idea of tax as a form of wealth distribution) as a 
form of theft that has a negative impact on individual autonomy.  Individuals who 
support taxation for redistributive purposes are presented by Melanie Phillips as 
immoral by denying ‘any moral basis for taking money away from people in order to 
give it to other people’ (5-6). This is followed by referring to a statement by an 
unacknowledged speaker ‘someone said earlier you know luck is not unfair’ (7-8) as a 
form of corroboration (Potter, 1996). Melanie Phillips also draws on an ‘effortfulness’ 
repertoire (Gibson, 2009) by suggesting that tax and the redistribution of wealth 
removes the need to be ‘solicitous’ (11).  Therefore, Melanie Phillips draws upon 
individualistic rhetoric to present the use of tax for redistributive purposes as being 
immoral as it penalises the wealthy for being economically active. 
Meanwhile, Mehdi Hasan interrupts Melanie Phillips (10) and provides a 
counter argument by claiming that her wealth is not purely self-gained but enabled by 
public expenditure. Mehdi Hasan frames tax as a societal investment that wealth 
individuals, such as Melanie Phillips, personally benefit from and, as in the previous 
extract, presents taxation as providing common goods. In particular, Mehdi Hasan 
rejects the notion that wealth is generated based on individual merit (‘You didn’t make 
that money on your own’, 12), but rather due to ‘investments’ in society through public 
spending. Mehdi Hasan lists two such investments specifically, education and health. 
Due to the universal nature of their provision, Mehdi Hasan presents Melanie Phillips as 
having benefitted from these services.  Melanie Phillips dismisses Mehdi Hasan’s 
challenge (15-17) as an ‘assumption’ that ‘all wealth is basically ill gotten and all 
poverty is moral’ (16-17), thus implying that he ideologically favours the poor over the 
wealthy.   
The third extract involves the presenter Michael Buerk (MB) and Canon Dr 
Angus Ritchie (AR) who is an Anglican Priest and theologian. In this extract AR 
constructs taxation as an ideological dilemma by referring to social justice and 
individual responsibility repertoires. The extract demonstrates the difficulties for 
speakers orienting to social justice when talking about tax. 
Extract Three 
 
By asking if tax is a ‘moral good in and of itself’ (1), Michael Buerk questions the 
morality of taxation which requires Angus Ritchie to manage his response by presenting 
tax as a resource that produces moral goods.  Michael Buerk does not pursue what the 
1. MB: Is tax a, is taxation a moral good in and of itself? 
2. 
3. 
4. 
AR: I think taxation enables certain moral goods to 
proceed it, it’s something which can contribute to the 
common good.  
5. MB: So, so the more the better? 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
AR: No a, absolutely not.  I mean I think because part of 
the purpose of government is to create an 
environment in which individuals, families, civil 
society, and enterprise can flourish so there is a moral 
case for tax because it enables that to happen, it 
enables certain common goods to be pursued which 
would not otherwise be pursued and also it enables us 
to address excessive inequality which interestingly 
David Cameron agreed diminished us all. 
‘moral goods’ are and utilises an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986), ‘So, so 
the more the better?’ (5), to solicit a response from Angus Ritchie regarding levels of 
taxation.  This is emphasised further by the use of questioning to direct the talk to this 
particular issue (Bolden, 2008).  Angus Ritchie refutes this assertion and constructs the 
purpose of government to ‘create an environment’ (7-8) which can be seen as 
meritocratic as this provides all members of society with the same starting point in life.  
Angus Ritchie constructs government’s role (and implicitly the role of taxation) as 
creating an environment which enables various parties to ‘flourish’. Angus Ritchie uses 
a four-part list including ‘individuals, families, civil society and enterprise’ (8-9) which 
functions to suggest that everyone within society benefits from taxation and describes 
taxation as enabling ‘common goods’. He then suggests that taxes can be used to 
address ‘excessive inequality’ (13). Angus Ritchie thus presents tax as a tool for social 
justice.   
This notion that taxation should be used to re-distribute wealth however is 
qualified by referring only to ‘excessive’ inequality. Whilst excessive inequality is 
presented as immoral, Angus Ritchie leaves open the possibility that some degree of 
inequality might be inevitable (or even desirable) in a meritocracy. By reporting the 
words of David Cameron that are from a differing ideological position, Angus Ritchie 
uses a discursive device that strengthens his own argument.  The quoting of opposing 
political position in support of your own argument is a strategy that presents the speaker 
as neutral and prevents their argument from being challenged (Antaki and Leudar, 
2001).  His argument is further strengthened through the reference to excessive 
inequality, a vague measure, Angus Ritchie is not required to specify what level of 
inequality is moral or to account further for his position.  Angus Ritchie can thus be 
seen to be managing an ideological dilemma between equality and fairness. Taxation is 
constructed as a resource to address excessive income inequality through creating a 
meritocratic level playing field. Angus Ritchie thus argues for wealth redistribution 
while presenting income inequality as acceptable (and fair) provided that is not 
excessive.   
Discussion 
There are two competing arguments over tax. Its supporters present tax as having the 
potential to reduce inequality by being a redistributive investment for the benefit of 
society. Other speakers draw on individualistic arguments to present tax as stifling 
individual autonomy and as a form of theft of individual wealth.  By presenting tax as a 
form of theft by the state, tax comes to be presented as morally problematic. In doing 
so, individual autonomy is prioritised over social justice, which helps to argue for the 
maintenance of social inequality.  The use of individualistic arguments presenting the 
world as ‘just’ supports previous findings in talk about welfare recipients (Goodman & 
Carr 2017).  This found that talk about benefit claimants warranted their status as 
deserved due to their unemployed status. 
 The construction of tax as having a negative impact on the individual draws on 
neoliberal ideology.  Individualism is a central tenet of neoliberalism which considers 
the welfare state to be an attack on individual’s resilience and motivation (Hall, 2011).  
Whilst neoliberalism is seen to lack a clear definition (Hall, 2011), it involves the 
dissemination of free market economic principles (Crouch, 2011).  In particular, 
neoliberalism is presented as being inevitable (Hall, 2011) in the media and political 
spheres (Phelan, 2014).  Neoliberalism justifies inequality in other settings through its 
emphasis on individual freedoms and through endorsing the state as providing 
meritocratic conditions (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).  This reflects the individualistic 
constructions of tax in the corpus, in which high tax rates are presented as negative on 
the grounds that the state is only required to provide a meritocratic environment and not 
economic equality.   
By placing an emphasis on the individual in relation to their responsibilities 
(Dean, 2004), the role of the state in regards to welfare provision, which has previously 
been seen as a fundamental right for British citizens come to be questioned (Conover, 
Crewe & Searing, 1991).  Income redistribution is constructed as restrictive upon 
individual rights within the corpus which enables taxation to be presented as unfair to 
more affluent individuals (Augoustinos & Every, 2007).  Opponents of higher tax rates 
appropriate a ‘togetherness’ interpretive repertoire to construct the less affluent as 
‘other’ and hold them accountable to more mainstream neoliberal norms (Wetherell & 
Potter, 1988) which discredits their need for resources.    Challenges to individualistic 
constructions of tax require the management of ‘individual and collective dilemmas of 
responsibility’ (Tileagă, 2012, p.215).  Neoliberal talk contrasts with the social justice 
repertoire used in the corpus.  This is enhanced through neoliberal rhetoric emphasising 
an individual’s financial independence (Lakoff, 1995; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). From 
such a neoliberal position, state activities are largely presented as discouraging 
‘effortfulness’ (Gibson, 2009, p.400). In particular, just world arguments are used to 
hold less affluent groups, such as the unemployed, responsible for their circumstances 
and not deserving of state support.  This supports the findings of Goodman and Carr 
(2017) who found that talk about welfare claimants used just world rhetoric to present 
them as undeserving of their benefits.   
 Such neoliberal discourse is resisted within the corpus through the utilisation of 
a ‘social justice discourse’ (Griffiths, Connor, Robertson & Phelan, 2013, p.287) which 
constructs tax as a resource to provide public services to meet a collective 
responsibility.  This has elsewhere been referred to as a ‘togetherness’ interpretative 
repertoire which can be constructed as being supportive of equality (Wetherell & Potter 
1988, p.181).   
 Discourse about taxation involves the construction of the moral identity of 
recipients of public spending.  This means that it draws up discursive resources such as 
deservingness and the notion of a just world.  Individualism constructs wealth as 
positive and provides the more affluent with a heightened moral status (Aguiar, 2012).  
Previous research has identified individual morality being constructed through 
deservingness, with individuals who are employed and not in need of state support 
being presented as morally superior (Goodman & Carr 2017).  This reflects the data 
where tax as a form of redistribution was constructed as immoral as it takes away 
wealth from those who ‘deserve it’ and gives it to the undeserving.  
Conclusion  
Speakers manage two contradictory constructions of tax which draw upon 
individualistic and social justice repertoires.  In the final extract, this requires a speaker 
to negotiate an ideological dilemma (Billig et al., 1988) around equality and fairness. 
Arguments for redistribution via increased tax are controversial and require an 
acceptance of a degree of inequality as just in a meritocratic society.  While egalitarian 
and meritocratic values may be deemed ‘common place’ values, they can be considered 
somewhat contradictory. In a meritocracy, inequality can be viewed as a just outcome as 
success is determined by an individual’s ability and effort.  As a result of this, inequality 
in society can be constructed as being both fair and unfair. However, arguments for 
increasing taxes and/or using taxation to redistribute wealth may be more successful if 
they are framed in terms of creating a level playing field within a meritocratic system.    
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